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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
An increased performance orientation has been a cornerstone of the 2014-20 programmes. For ESI 
Funds, a key element of the shift towards a stronger performance orientation is the application of a 
Performance Framework (PF) which involves the establishment of clear, measurable milestones and 
targets to ensure progress in implementation. In the case of OPs under the investment for growth and 
jobs goal, the PF is linked to a Performance Review, carried out by DG REGIO in 2019. If the 
Performance Review shows the milestones set in the PF have been met, a Performance Reserve is 
made available for use by the Managing Authorities (MAs), which is 6 percent of OP funding. For the 
PF, MAs can set targets in the form of indicators or, so-called, key implementation steps. Indicators 
can be financial indicators or output indicators, and these can be either common indicators suggested 
by the European Commission (EC) or programme-specific (result indicators are only used for the 
ESF). Key implementation steps can also be used in cases where no outputs are expected by 2018. 
Although at an early stage in their implementation, the PF have already been the focus of a number of 
studies, most notably for the EC and for the European Court of Auditors (ECA).1 Initial findings of the 
studies identify a role for the PF in, e.g. strengthening the result orientation of programmes. However, 
other analyses are more critical. In its Annual Report for  WKH (&$¶V DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH
preparations for the PF was discouraging, particularly in terms of the incentive effect of the 
3HUIRUPDQFH 5HVHUYH µ«WKH LPSDFW RI WKH SHUIRUPDQFH UHVHUYH LQ WHUPV RI HQFRXUDJLQJ DQ
increased focus on results, is likely to be no more than marginal, since there remain no real financial 
incentives or sanctions in the 2014-2020 period relating to the results achieved with the EU funding.¶2 
Much of this evidence is based on the preliminary experiences of the PF and highlight issues linked to 
programming and establishing the PFs, e.g. concerning its role in reinforcing programme strategies 
and issues related to establishing appropriate indicators. However, as the PF is implemented in 
practice, it is possible to provide an early assessment of its contribution to strategic management of 
programmes and their effect in terms of pursuing the result orientation.  
$JDLQVWWKLVEDFNJURXQGWKHSDSHUH[DPLQHVSURJUDPPHV¶SUDFWLFDOH[SHULHQFHVRIZRUNLQJZLWKWhe 
PF. The paper identifies significant differences in the scope and scale of the PF of the IQ-Net 
programmes. It finds that IQ-Net programme managers largely agree with the underlying logic of the 
PF from the EC point of view and there is substantial support for some form of performance-related 
measures. The research found aspects of the process to be useful for focussing efforts on strategic 
planning, delivery and capturing results. Thus, the PF has value in emphasising that programmes 
cannot simply wait until the end of the programme period to think about results. Specific benefits 
identified include the PFV¶ role in eQKDQFLQJSURJUDPPHV¶UHVXOWVIRFXVLWVXVHDVDWRROIRUVWUDWHJLF
management, its capacity to build commitment to and awareness of targets. Thus, the PF is identified 
                                                     
1
 See particularly: SWECO, ÖIR, Spatial Foresight (2016) The Implementation of the Performance Frameworks 
in the 2014-2020 ESI Funds, European Commission; European Court of Auditors (2017a) Special Report: The 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VQHJRWLDWLRQRI-2020 Partnership Agreements and programmes in Cohesion: Spending more 
targeted on Europe 2020 priorities, but increasingly complex arrangements to measure performance, European 
Court of Auditors, No. 2.; and European Court of Auditors (2017b) Ex ante conditionalities and Performance 
Reserve in Cohesion: innovative but not yet effective instruments, Special Report, No. 15. 
2
 European Court of Auditors (2015) Annual report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHILQDQFLDO\HDUWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHLQVWLWXWLRQV¶UHSOLHV, paragraph 3.65, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/annualreports-2014/annualreports-2014-EN.pdf  
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as having a valued role at various stages in programme development and delivery, and across at 
various levels. However, a number of challenges are also identified which have led some authorities 
to question the value of specific aspects/elements of the process; raise broader questions about the 
added value of the exercise; and propose areas that could be changed in the immediate future and 
longer-term.  
The paper identifies practical challenges in the early stages of establishing the PF, e.g. in relation to 
identifying appropriate, good quality, reliable data for a wide range of, at times, highly complicated 
indicators. Further challenges include the lack of flexibility and uncertainty, which programmes feel 
limit their capacity to accurately convey progress and respond to change. In particular, there is a 
perceived lack of flexibility from the EC in allowing changes to the indicators/targets. Compounding 
concerns about the lack of flexibility and the impact of delays is the fact that, currently, the PF only 
takes into account completed actions.3 The tight focus on key milestones and targets can build in a 
rigidity into the programmes with the result of disadvantaging more innovative/experimental projects 
or less experienced/new applicants. Further, uncertainty over how this Performance Reserve will be 
applied is a frustration. 
What the PF adds to existing arrangements is also brought into question by others. Several 
programme managers point out that the existing n+3 rule already seeks to ensure that sufficient 
progress is made and incentivises performance to meet financial targets. The idea of the PF working 
as a sanction rather than a positive incentive was criticised by a number of IQ-Net programme 
authorities. The effectiveness of the incentive is also diminished by the expectation that the EC will 
pay the reserve to all Member States, whether specific Priorities meet milestones or not. Further, the 
award of the Performance Reserve on the basis of what is considered a narrow, partial view of what 
the programmes are achieving is a concern. For many IQ-Net programme authorities, the PF is a 
useful tool for measuring efficiency, but is very limited in measuring effectiveness.  
Many MAs would like to see an end to the Performance Reserve (or a PF but no reserve) due to the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH EXUGHQV DQG µUHG WDSH¶ WKDW LW JHQHUDWHV IRU WKH 0$ DQG ,% +RZHYHU WKHUH LV
recognition of the value of a result orientation, but it needs to be done in the right way. With this in 
mind the paper goes on to outline some suggestions and recommendations for change to reinforce 
the positive elements of the PF and address concerns. These include recommendations to help 
address administrative burdens, maximising value and quality of indicators and data, encourage 
greater differentiation in the thematic application of the PF, improve flexibility and responsiveness, 
and build added value.  
The report concludes that looking to the future in a context of growing needs and budgetary discipline, 
LW LV DUJXHG WKDW D FRQWLQXHG IRFXV RQ SHUIRUPDQFH LV µXQDYRLGDEOH¶4 IQ-Net programme managers 
largely agree with the underlying logic of the PF from the EC point of view. However, while there is 
support for the general principle, questions are raised about the current application in a highly 
complex system such as Cohesion policy.  
                                                     
3
 Likely regulatory changes for early 2018 would allow the inclusion of partially completed interventions. 
4
 Calviño N (2016) Budget Focused on Results, presentation to the European Parliament CONT Committee, 24 
May 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/budget4results/news/BFOR_presentation_CONT_20160524.pdf  
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INTRODUCTION  
More attention, time and money are spent on performance measurement and evaluation in the public 
sector than ever before.5 The aim is better informed budgets, greater administrative efficiency and 
robust public accountability. An increased performance orientation is a cornerstone of the 2014-20 
Operational Programmes (OPs). Requirements envisage a stronger performance orientation involving 
more clearly specified objectives, intervention logics, targets and results. For ESI Funds, a key 
element of the shift towards a stronger performance orientation is the application of a Performance 
Framework (PF), which involves the establishment of clear measurable milestones and targets to 
ensure progress in implementation.  
Previous studies6 highlight a number of perceived benefits in the approach, e.g. strengthening the 
result orientation, ensuring focus in the programmes, and enabling comparability across indicators. 
However, an increasing body of literature refers to the unintended consequences of increased 
measurement in public policy, which can even have negative impacts on performance.7 More 
specifically, as the PF has been applied in practice, issues have emerged, such as challenges in 
setting realistic targets and difficulties in measuring complex or innovative interventions. More 
strategic questions are also asked: whether the PF makes a valuable contribution to the strategic 
management of programmes; is the current approach adequately conveys the performance of 
programmes? Thus, key questions/issues for this paper are: 
x What are the SURJUDPPHV¶H[SHULences of working with the PF? 
x Is a more strategic role of the PF being fulfilled? What does it actually tell programme managers, 
what does it do for programme focus, implementation efficiency, improved delivery etc.? 
x Could this approach to performance management be taken forward in the future?  
x In a changing policy context, is data gathering worth the effort? Are new approaches needed? 
This report paper draws on the experience of the members of the IQ-Net network, based on a mix of 
desk research and interviews (conducted in autumn 2017) with national and regional government 
officials working on the implementation of Cohesion policy programmes in the 16 Member States. 
Interviews have also been carried out with European Commission staff at the DG REGIO Units B.2 
µ(YDOXDWLRQDQG(XURSHDQ6HPHVWHU¶DQG&µ$XGLW,,¶ 
As set out in Table 1, the paper begins (in Section 1) by outlining the EC framework for the PF. 
Section 2 examines the processes involved in establishing PFs. Section 3 focuses on the 
implementation of the frameworks and preparations for the Performance Review. Section 4 presents 
H[SORUHVSURJUDPPHDXWKRULWLHV¶ of working with the PF. Section 5 considers recommendations for the 
IXWXUHDQG6HFWLRQVHWVRXWWKHUHSRUW¶VFRQFOXVLRQV 
                                                     
5
 OECD (1996) Performance auditing and the modernisation of government. Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Press. 
6
 SWECO, ÖIR, Spatial Foresight (2016) The Implementation of the Performance Frameworks in the 2014-2020 
ESI Funds, European Commission and European Court of Auditors (2017a) 6SHFLDO5HSRUW7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
negotiation of 2014-2020 Partnership Agreements and programmes in Cohesion: Spending more targeted on 
Europe 2020 priorities, but increasingly complex arrangements to measure performance, European Court of 
Auditors, No. 2. 
7
 Robinson M (2014) Connecting Evaluation and Budgeting, Evaluation Capacity Development, EDC Working 
Paper Series, No. 30 March 2014. 
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Table 1: Report structure 
Section 1 
Rationale of the Performance 
Framework and Review 
x Performance Framework 
x Performance Review  
x Performance Reserve 
x Initial expectations and early assessments 
Section 2 
Establishing the Performance 
Frameworks 
x How were the PF established and by whom 
x Key considerations 
x Challenges addressed 
Section 3 
Implementation: Preparing for the 
Performance Review 2019 
x Preparations for the Performance Review 
x Progress towards targets and anticipated challenges 
Section 4 
Programme Experiences of 
working with the Performance 
Framework: Value and Limitations 
x Areas of value for programme management and 
delivery 
x Limitations and constraints derived from the process 
Section 5 Future recommendations  
x Addressing administrative burden 
x Maximising value and quality of indicators and data  
x Improving flexibility and responsiveness 
x Building added value 
Section 6 Conclusions   
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1. THE RATIONALE OF THE PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK AND 
REVIEW 
The Performance Framework (PF) is one of the three pillars upon which the result orientation of the 
2014-20 European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) are based (see Figure 1).8 
Figure 1: Pillars of the ESIF result orientation 
 
The PF consists of selected indicators, as well as key implementation steps for each Priority. In the 
case of OPs under the investment for growth and jobs goal, the PF is linked to a:  
x Performance Review, carried out by DG REGIO in the second half of 2019 on the basis of 
the Annual Implementation Reports (AIRs) for 2018, which, if positive, results in the payment 
of the; 
x Performance Reserve, which is six SHUFHQWRIWKH23¶VIXQGLQJUDQJLQJIURPWo 7 percent 
for each Priority Axis.9 
The allocation of a performance-based financial reserve is not new in Cohesion policy. A compulsory 
Performance Reserve was in place in the 2000-06 programme period. However, it was made 
voluntary for the 2007-13 period, when only two Member States (Italy and Poland) made use of an 
ERDF Performance Reserve. IQ-Net research from 201210 found that the approach taken in 2000-06 
was not felt to be useful by many IQ-Net programme authorities (Austria, Finland, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, United Kingdom), although there were some positive experiences (Greece). Targets were 
                                                     
8
 European Commission (2014a) Performance Review and Reserve, Guidance Fiche, Final Version, 14 May 
2014. 
9
 Except for OPs under the European Territorial Cooperation goal, OP Priorities dedicated to Technical 
Assistance, the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) and other instances listed in Article 20 of the Common 
Provisions Regulation (CPR). 
10
 Mendez C, Kah S and Bachtler J (2012) The Promise and Perils of the Performance Turn in EU Cohesion 
policy, IQ-Net Thematic Paper 31(2), European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow. 
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often set at low levels to make sure they were achievable. Some of these points echo findings from an 
ECA report from 2007, which assessed the implementation of the Performance Reserve in the 2000-
 SURJUDPPH SHULRG DQG FRQFOXGHG µThe performance reserve was used primarily to maximise 
spending rather than to concentrate spending on areas which were shown to be particularly 
effective.¶11 
The new PF for 2014-20 takes a different approach. It is intended to ensure the programmes deliver 
µwhat is under the control of the Managing Authorities¶12 In practice, this means that Priorities are 
implemented as planned, the programme is kept on course to achieve its objectives, and problems 
are anticipated and tackled as soon as they arise. 
The PF is established at Priority level, with the exception of complex Priorities covering more than 
one Fund or category of region.13 The PF consists of up to four different types of indicator (financial, 
output, result, and key implementation steps), whose progress is reviewed twice, in 2019 and 2025,14 
against milestones and targets, see Table 2. EC guidance states that the number of indicators 
selected for a Priority should be as limited as possible, as the risk of failing to achieve the milestones 
increases with the number of indicators. 
Table 2: The building blocks of the Performance Framework 
Indicators  
(at Priority level) Milestones (intermediate targets) Targets 
Financial 
x Must be included 
x Total amount of eligible expenditure entered into the accounting system of the 
certifying authority (except for EAFRD) 
Output 
x Must be included 
x Not additional ± chosen from among indicators already selected for the programme  
x Limited number (majority of resources allocated) 
Result x To be used only where appropriate (close link to supported policy interventions) x Different approach Fund by Fund 
Key implementation 
steps 
x To be used when necessary  
(no outputs) 
x Should not be used as outputs must 
be delivered by then 
Source=LyáNRZVNL--M (2013) Performance Framework 2014-2020, Evaluation and European Semester Unit, 
DG for Regional and Urban Policy, Brussels, 15 March 2013. 
Milestones are intermediate targets set for indicators to be achieved by 31 December 2018. The 
targets themselves are set to be achieved by 31 December 2023. According to Annex II of the 
Common Provisions Regulation, both milestones (end of 2018) and targets (end of 2023) should be:  
x realistic; 
x achievable;  
                                                     
11
 European Court of Auditors (2007) Special Report No 1/2007 concerning the implementation of the mid-term 
processes on the Structural Funds 2000-WRJHWKHUZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSOLHV (2007/C 124/01), 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR07_01/SR07_01_EN.PDF  
12
 European Commission (2014a) op. cit., p. 2. 
13
 µWhere more than one category of region (the Structural Funds only), all the indicators, their milestones and 
targets, as well as their achieved values, have to be broken down by Fund and category of region¶VHHEuropean 
Commission (2014a) op. cit., p. 9. For such complex Priorities, the verification of whether the selected output 
indicators relate to operations representing the majority of resources is to be carried out at the level of each Fund 
or category of region within the Priority. 
14
 Progress in European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMMF) OPs is reviewed in 2019 and 2024. 
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x relevant; 
x capture essential information on the progress of a Priority;  
x consistent with the nature and character of the specific objectives of the Priority;  
x transparent, with objectively verifiable targets; 
x have a source data identified (where possible, publicly available);  
x verifiable (without imposing a disproportionate administrative burden); and  
x consistent across the programmes, where appropriate. 
In its Partnership Agreement (PA), each Member State outlines the methodology and mechanisms to 
ensure consistency in the functioning of the PF across the programmes and ESI Funds, while the 
actual PFs are included in the programmes. The PAs include a table with information on the allocation 
related to the Performance Reserve, broken down by ESI Fund and, where appropriate, by category 
of region.15 
The PF is the focus of a formal Performance Review carried out by the EC. This will be carried 
twice, in 2019 and 2023. For the first Performance Review, data on progress towards PF milestones 
and targets are presented in the Annual Implementation Reports (AIR) for 2018, which are submitted 
to the EC by the end of June 2019. In addition to financial data, they are expected to include 
cumulative values for output indicators and, where appropriate, information about result indicators and 
key implementation steps. AIRs also include a complimentary section on issues affecting programme 
performance.16 From the date of receipt of the AIRs, the EC has two months to examine the 
achievement of the milestones. In practice, this means that decisions about the allocation of the 
Performance Reserve to successful Priorities will be taken at latest by the end of August 2019 
(see Table 3). 
Table 3: Timeline of the Performance Review 2019 
c. 2014 Performance Frameworks included in OPs 
end of 2018 OP implementation towards milestones 
end of June 2019 Member States report PF achievements to EC 
end of August 2019 EC adopts decision on allocation 
end of October 2019 MAs request OP amendments based on decision 
 
Within two months of the Performance Review, the EC will adopt a decision on the programmes and 
Priorities that have achieved their milestones and, subsequently the Performance Reserve can be 
made available to the successful Priorities. As has been noted, the Performance Reserve is a 
percentage of the funding allocation to a programme17 Priority and allocated to the relevant Priorities 
that achieve their targets by the end of 2018.18  
                                                     
15
 European Commission (2014a) op. cit. 
16
 European Commission (2014b) Guidance Document on Monitoring and Evaluation, European Cohesion Fund 
and European Regional Development Fund, Concepts and Recommendations. DG Regio, March 2014. 
17
 Except for the European Territorial Cooperation goal and other resources listed in Article 20 of the Common 
Provisions Regulation (CPR). 
18
 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 215/2014 of 7 March 2014.  
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µ6HULRXV IDLOXUH¶ to meet targets, which is defined as a failure to achieve at least 65 percent of the 
milestone value by the end of 2018,19 may lead to the suspension of interim payments. Failure to 
meet targets in 2025 could give rise to financial corrections. In cases where milestones have not been 
met in 2018, the reserve related to these Priorities may be reallocated among other Priorities that 
have achieved their milestones. If all Priorities in a programme fail to achieve their milestones, the 
Performance Reserve has to be reallocated to another programme in the same Member State.20 
In practice, this means that Member States cannot lose any funding. Allocation to other Priorities or 
OPs will require formal programme amendment procedures, which need the approval of the EC. In 
this case, the EC may make observations only if the proposed amendments are not compliant with 
applicable rules, are not consistent with the development needs of the Member State or the region or 
entail a significant risk that the objectives and targets included in the proposals cannot be achieved.  
The PF, with its Performance Review process and the potential allocation of its Performance Reserve 
were introduced with the expectation that they would incentivise the achievement of objectives 
and ensure that progress can be adequately measured.21 According to the EC, the PF provided 
incentives for MAs: 
x to focus on the key interventions for the programme; 
x to carefully select those indicators that best represent what the programme activities; and 
x to establish meaningful milestone/target values.  
The requirement to record information on how the PF was designed and to provide this information at 
EC request improved the understanding of the way programmes work, for both MAs and the EC.  
Although at an early stage in their implementation, the PF have already been the focus of a 
number of studies, most notably for the Commission and for the European Court of Auditors 
(ECA).22 Initial findings confirm some of the EC expectations and suggest that the PF would: 
x strengthen the result orientation/enhance focus in the programmes, e.g. with the PF helping 
to support the thematic focus of the programmes; 
x steer and guide programme implementation, with the PF acting as a control mechanism to 
anticipate and tackle problems,23 or concentrating resources on a smaller number and types 
of projects allowing better projects to be selected;24 
x provide realistic target setting on a sounder evidence base, e.g. the process of establishing 
the PF forced critical thought and analysis on what it was possible to achieve; 
                                                     
19
 Ibid. 
20
 On 6 December 2017, the European Commission published a legislative proposal to reform the ESIF CPR 
providing for the possibility to use all or part of the Performance Reserve in the current period (2018-20) to 
support structural reforms as part of the new EMU package: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-
finance/com_826_0.pdf  
21
 SWECO, ÖIR & Spatial Foresight (2016) op. cit. 
22
 See particularly: SWECO, ÖIR & Spatial Foresight (2016) op. cit., European Court of Auditors (2017a) op. cit. 
and European Court of Auditors (2017b) Ex ante conditionalities and Performance Reserve in Cohesion: 
innovative but not yet effective instruments, Special Report, No. 15. 
23
 SWECO ÖIR & Spatial Foresight (2016) op. cit., p. 5. 
24
 Mendez C, Wishlade F and Bachtler J (2013) A new dawn for Cohesion policy? The emerging budgetary and 
policy directions for 2014-20, EoRPA paper 13/4. 
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x improve comparability of indicators across programmes, through the use of the EC¶VFRPPRQ
output indicators;25  
x promote internal exchanges and dialogue through the process of developing indicators and 
targets ± the process necessitates a dialogue between programme stakeholders, evaluators 
and the EC;26 and crucially, 
x act as an incentive to deliver. 
However, RWKHUDQDO\VHVDUHPRUHFULWLFDO,QLWV$QQXDO5HSRUWIRUWKH(&$¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH
preparations for the PF was discouraging, particularly in terms of the incentive effect of the 
3HUIRUPDQFH 5HVHUYH µ«the impact of the performance reserve, in terms of encouraging an 
increased focus on results, is likely to be no more than marginal, since there remain no real financial 
incentives or sanctions in the 2014-2020 period relating to the results achieved with the EU funding.¶27 
Other concerns that have also emerged relate in particular to the increasingly complex 
arrangements to measure performance,28 including: 
x the administrative burden and developing, monitoring and reporting; 
x large numbers of programme-specific indicators have been developed linked to the way in 
which the programmes are structured and efforts to convey their at times complex and varied 
results,29 posing the question over whether a meaningful aggregation of performance data will 
be possible; 
x cRQFHUQVUDLVHGDERXWLQGLFDWRUV¶FDSDFLW\WRUHIOHFWFRQFUHWHDFKLHYHPHQWVHVSHFLDOO\
challenges in measuring specific types of complex or innovative intervention; 
x lack of ownership/understanding of the PF, as developing it was commonly undertaken by 
experts; 
x lack of coordinated interpretations ± Fund-specific regulations introduced different 
requirements for collecting and reporting performance data on outputs and results and for the 
financial monitoring of investments, e.g. there is no harmonised approach between the 
different Funds as to the use of common indicators.30  
x challenges in data gathering linked to poor definition of indicators and weak measurement; 
x unrealistic targets: either setting conservative milestones and targets or; over ambitious 
milestones and targets; and  
x concerns that indicator fixation could drive programmes.31  
  
                                                     
25
 SWECO ÖIR & Spatial Foresight (2016) op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 European Court of Auditors (2015) Annual report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHILQDQFLDO\HDUWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHLQVWLWXWLRQV¶UHSOLHV, paragraph 3.65, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/annualreports-2014/annualreports-2014-EN.pdf  
28
 European Court of Auditors (2017a) op. cit. and European Court of Auditors (2017b) op. cit. 
29
 Ibid, p. 12. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Mendez C, Wishlade F and Bachtler J (2013) op. cit. 
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2. ESTABLISHING THE PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Developing the Performance Framework: rationales and principles 
The following section focuses on the development of the PFs, who set the PFs, how, and what are the 
particular challenges encountered in establishing the Frameworks.  
2.1.1 Managing Authorities leading role in establishing programme 
Performance Frameworks, complemented by national guidance 
In IQ-Net programmes, the selection of PF indicators and setting of milestones/targets was mostly 
carried out by Managing Authorities (MAs) (e.g. Austria, Czech Integrated Regional OP, Denmark, 
France). In several countries, the national level provided methodological advice and guidance for 
the design of indicator systems, including PFs (France, Portugal, Spain, Sweden). 
x Portugal defined guiding principles for indicators and the PF and discussed these with the 
EC during the programme period for 2014-20.32 The document provided guidelines to ensure 
the representativeness of the PF, and it integrated EU-level and domestic requirements. At 
the level of PA, a list of common indicators was established, which should be used in as many 
OPs as possible.  
x In France, the central coordinating body CGET elaborated a methodology report, including 
targets, which was widely taken into account by MAs when selection indicators and 
milestones/targets at programme level. 
x In Spain, the national level MA organised meetings with all regions to coordinate the 
definition and selection of indicators and provided guidance. 
x In Sweden, the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation had several meetings about this issue 
and put forward strong recommendations that the programmes use one or two indicators 
in their PF. 
In some cases, Intermediate Bodies (IBs) played an important role (e.g. in Slovenia). In England, 
milestones and targets were developed jointly by different territorial levels, the MA involved Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which allowed development needs and the different distribution of 
financial resources to be taken into account. 
2.1.2 Indicators definitions informed by past programme experience 
The overarching rationale in selecting indicators was to keep the PF simple and manageable. 
Several programme authorities aimed to select as few indicators as possible for the PF (e.g. 
Austria, Sweden, Wales) and, more generally, to use fewer indicators overall than in 2007-13 
(Vlaanderen). In Austria and in most OPs in Sweden, only one output indicator per Priority Axis was 
selected for the PF. Key implementation steps have not been used in many cases (a notable 
exception is in Pomorskie). In France, key implementation steps as a new concept are felt to have 
created some confusion. 
                                                     
32
 Agência para o Desenvolvimento e Coesão (2014) Princípios orientadores para indicadores e quadro de 
desempenho na programação 2014-2020 (Guiding principles for indicators and Performance Framework in 2014-
2020 programming), version of 28 July 2014, 
http://www.adcoesao.pt/sites/default/files/portugal2020/monitorizacao/doc_orientacao_da_monitorizacao_estrate
gica/principios_orientadores_para_indicadores_e_quadro_de_desempenho_na_programacao_2014_2020.pdf 
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IQ-Net programme authorities stressed that indicators should be easy to define and to measure 
(e.g. Austria, Czech Integrated Regional OP, Wales). In this context, having experience with the 
definition and measurement of the selected indicators is important (Finland, Scotland). In 
Scotland, indicators were chosen from a range of indicators already being measured, either as part of 
national frameworks or frameworks the lead implementation partners were already using. In Finland, 
all indicators selected for the PF were already in use in the 2007-13 programme period. An additional 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ LQ 9ODDQGHUHQ ZDV VHOHFWLQJ LQGLFDWRUV ZKHUH WKH 0$ KDG VRPH VFRSH WR µVWHHU¶ WKH
indicator, so it would be able to adjust target values of the project beneficiaries if necessary and thus 
reduce the risk of not achieving milestones and targets for the PF. 
As suggested by the EC guidance,33 some programme authorities specifically chose to select 
indicators that cover a large part of a Priority Axis (Austria, Sweden). Sweden considered their 
programmes to be focused enough that one output indicator is sufficient to reflect most of their Priority 
Axes. Having only a few indicators in the PF also makes it easier to monitor their progress and take 
corrective actions if needed (Sweden Norra Mellansverige OP). 
Looking at the definition of milestones and targets, experiences gained in the previous 
programme period were the most important factors in developing realistic values (e.g. Austria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, País Vasco, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Wales). In the 
case of the Slovak OP Integrated Infrastructure, the selection of indicators and the setting of 
milestones has been based on the information provided by a domestic strategic document ± the 
Slovak Transport Master Plan. 
However, establishing robust indicators and targets is particularly problematic in cases where there is 
no µWUDFNUHFRUG¶IRUVHWWLQJWKHLQGLFDWRUVDQGWDUJHWV e.g. innovative interventions under RTDI, SME 
support, education 
 (Pomorskie, Slovakia). For some indicators, neither the EC nor MAs had robust points of reference in 
developing the PF. In Denmark, issues arose with new thematic priorities for 2014-20. In these areas, 
the MA could not base the definition of milestones and targets on previous experience. Performance 
figures thus far indicate that the estimates made were not always accurate. This raises the wider 
question of whether programmes will unlock the reserve because of good performance or because 
the targets were set too low. 
A more general issue encountered by IQ-Net programme authorities in establishing the PF was the 
ODFNRI WLPH WRSODQDSURJUDPPH¶VGDWD UHTXLUHPHQWV properly. For example in Pomorskie, as 
has been noted, there is a recognised lack of experience in indicator setting, especially at the regional 
level (in 2007-13, criteria were set at the national level and defined according to previous experience). 
Compounding the issue, it was felt that the EC had limited time and capacity to discuss and agree 
indicators with the MA. The MA produced a comprehensive report outlining the assumptions behind 
its PF, but there was no EC response to this. Similarly, there was little input from the Polish 
government. Thus, the process lacked transparency and comparability: each Polish region had its 
own suggested indicators and targets. As a result, the MA has learned very little from the exercise: it 
suggested certain indicators and targets and no-one from the EC assessed or discussed these: it has 
SURYHGWREHDµER[-WLFNLQJ¶H[HUFLVHUDWKHUWKDQDVWUDWHJLFSURFHVV 
                                                     
33
 European Commission (2014a) op. cit., p. 6. 
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2.1.3 Establishing the Performance Framework is a resource intensive 
exercise 
For IQ-Net programme authorities, establishing the PF was resource intensive exercise. 
Considerable staff resource was expended on the development of the PF, setting indicators and 
targets, e.g. in England and Wales. In Sweden, the process was time consuming due in part to the 
organisation and implementation of a number of training courses related to preparing beneficiaries for 
the PF and gathering information to inform indicators and targets. In Croatia, ensuring commonly 
agreed definitions proved challenging and required intensive consultations between the organisations 
involved, and the EC. As has already been highlighted, in some cases, lack of qualified staff and skills 
further complicated the task, e.g. in Croatia and Poland. Building technical capacity was also a 
concern (England, Slovenia). For example, in England, the M$¶V H&ODLPV GDWDEDVH LV VWLOO XQGHU
development and at present, the authority does not have the capacity to store and update all the 
information on line.  
As programmes progress, data gathering and maintenance remains time-consuming and 
resource-intensive. This substantial administrative load is felt across the institutions involved, down 
to the level of project applicants (e.g. in Croatia, Finland, Sweden).  
x In England, the on-going requirement to update performance data requires resource in both 
the ERDF policy and regional ERDF delivery teams, as producing reliable data at such a 
detailed level and ensuring consistency across programmes is challenging. In Finland, time 
and personnel are also committed at project applicant and project levels. Both are required to 
be familiar with the indicator system and definitions, and ensure indicators are correctly 
reported. In Scotland, the level of detail required to evidence the outputs has also been 
challenging for project sponsors.34 All lead partners have said that they have µunder-
resourced¶ for this task ± µPuch more iQIRUPDWLRQ QHHGV WR EH JDWKHUHG « way more than 
EHIRUH¶ In this case, project sponsors feel that it exceeds what is asked for under other 
regimes.  
All of these issues are especially acute for multi-Fund programmes. France notes that the practical 
implementation requirements do not favour integrated multi-Fund programmes. In France, most OPs 
are multi-Fund and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) features prominently. This presents a 
particular challenge, as H[SODLQHGLQWKH(&¶VJXLGDQFH µIn the case of priorities which concern more 
than one Fund providing support under Cohesion policy or category of region (the Structural Funds 
only), the achievement of milestones will be assessed separately for each of the Funds and each 
category of region within the priority, taking into account the indicators, their milestones and their 
achievement values broken down by Fund and category of region. If the YEI is implemented as part of 
a priority, the YEI specific allocation along with the matching ESF support for the YEI is to be treated 
separately.¶35 
                                                     
34
 In England it is suggested that the unique situation in the UK, with Brexit on the horizon, could lead to potential 
applicants concluding that the effort involved in gathering such large, detailed amounts of data outweighs the 
benefits of ERDF co-financing. 
35
 European Commission (2014a) op. cit., p. 15. 
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2.2 Content of the Performance Frameworks 
2.2.1 Performance Frameworks draw on Common and Programme Specific 
Indicators to differing extents 
The following sections focus on the practical arrangements in place that make up the programme PF, 
it is important to note that the figures below relate to the use of indicators in programmes overall, not 
specifically to their use in PFs. The EU28 combined created a total of 2,240 different programme-
specific indicators (PSI) for the ERDF, in addition to the 40 common output indicators (COI, see 
Annex), which can be used for ERDF OPs under the investment for growth and jobs goal. On 
average, each ERDF OP used 14.8 COI and 13.2 different PSI.  
Figure 2 shows the use of COI and PSI in ERDF and ESF OPs. Member States tended to create 
more PSI for TOs under ESF than under ERDF. For ERDF, the highest numbers of PSI are being 
used under TO4 (low-carbon). 
Figure 2: Total number of output indicators used in ERDF and ESF OPs in the EU28 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2017a) op. cit., p. 63. 
Narrowing this down to indicators used in the PF specifically and to a sample of 17 IQ-Net 
programmes, most of the programme authorities analysed opted to use more PSI than COI in 
their PFs (5.8 PSI versus 4.4 COI on average). The size and thematic breadth of a programme does 
not automatically result in a higher number of PF indicators. As Figure 3 illustrates, the number of COI 
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used in PFs ranges from just one (Denmark, Portuguese Competitiveness and Internationalisation 
OP, Pomorskie) to 12 (Central Makedonia, Greece). At the same time, 14 PSI have been defined in 
the Czech Integrated OP, compared to only one in Austria, Denmark and País Vasco. The most 
commonly used COI in the sample of IQ-Net programmes is COI1, which refers WR WKH µnumber of 
HQWHUSULVHVUHFHLYLQJVXSSRUW¶ and is used in 10 out of 17 analysed PFs. 
Figure 3: Number of COI and PSI in PFs of IQ-Net programmes 
 
Source: EPRC research based on IQ-Net programme documents. 
Figure 4 shows the balance between COI and PSI in 17 IQ-Net programmes. While some 
programme authorities rely widely on COI (e.g. País Vasco, Central Makedonia), others use 
predominantly PSI that they defined themselves (e.g. Pomorskie, Portuguese Competiveness and 
Internationalisation OP). EU-wide, 60 percent of PF indicators are COI and 40 percent are PSI. In 
Scotland, the EC encouraged the MA to use COI and also any Scottish PSI have been based on COI 
DV FORVHO\ DV SRVVLEOH HJ E\ UHSODFLQJ µEXVLQHVV¶ ZLWK µRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶ XQGHU WKH ORZ-carbon/green 
infrastructure measures.  
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Figure 4: Ratio between COI and PSI in PFs of IQ-Net programmes 
 
Source: EPRC research based on IQ-Net programme documents. 
IQ-Net programme authorities recognise the usefulness of indicators more widely and recognise 
the value of common indicators at EU-level. Several valued EC advice to keep indicator systems 
simple (Austria, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Portugal). As Figure 5 illustrates, views about COI are generally 
positive or neutral. Nevertheless, the following issues were highlighted in relation to COI.  
x In Denmark, the MA feels that, in spite of their usefulness for an EU-wide comparison, COI 
can be complicated to use in some cases. For instance, COI for green projects under TO4 are 
not always suitable. For the MA, it is difficult to demonstrate how their activities/outputs can fit 
the indicators on issues such as CO2 reduction, which are broad indicators and it is difficult to 
measure against them.  
x Some of the indicators are seen as too broad even for PA level and need contextualised 
(Portugal). In Bizkaia (País Vasco), standard output indicators are used (e.g. no. of projects) 
under the PF, but more in-depth contextual indicators are collected for internal purposes and 
accountability to the monitoring committee with a view to providing a more comprehensive 
account of project performance. 
x The interpretation of some indicators varies, weakening the value of comparisons across 
programmes or countries (Czech Republic, Portugal, Wales). As similar point was made by 
Greece, which argued that tKHUHLVDQHHGIRUWKH(&WRSURYLGHDµPHWKRGRORJ\¶IRUWKHXVHRI
the indicators (Greece). 
x 7KH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI D µRQH-size-fits-DOO¶ DSSURDFK covering such diverse programmes is 
questioned (e.g. in England). 
x Some indicators are measured at national level (e.g. business-related ones) and are therefore 
of limited use for regional programme authorities (Scotland). 
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Figure 5: Assessment of COI by IQ-Net programme managers 
 
Source: IQ-Net research based on 20 respondents from 12 Member States. 
Addressing some of the criticisms of the COI, PSI can be more context and programme-specific, 
allowing measures of progress to be less general and to better reflect the character of the 
programmes. However, given their diversity, programmes use an extremely wide range of PSI,36 
which can limit the scope for comparisons and reinforces challenges of complexity and administrative 
burdens. Reinforcing a point made by the ECA, France notes that too many indicators are in use 
simultaneously. Also, the fact that thH LQGLFDWRU LV µWDLORUHG¶ WR WKH SURJUDPPH PD\ PHDQ GDWD
availability and access is difficult. For instance, in Denmark there have been some isolated problems 
with certain indicators which can be difficult to collect, e.g. due to issues surrounding data protection. 
2.2.2 Challenges in establishing indicators, data and targets 
The PF means that MAs and IBs are under pressure to not only under pressure ensure fast, efficient 
and effective spending, but also to ensure the outputs and results of that spending is useful, and 
accurately and clearly conveyed. Central to this is the quality of the indicators, data and targets. 
Several IQ-Net programme authorities (Denmark, England, Nordrhein-Westfalen, País Vasco, 
Portugal, Vlaanderen) consider all TOs to be suitable for the PF, as long as the appropriate 
indicators are selected.  
PF indicators have been formally evaluated as part of ex ante evaluations and will be considered 
again as part of subsequent studies (e.g. England, Slovakia, Sweden, Wales).37 In Wales, the 
indicator system is reviewed yearly in terms of definitions. The MA provides training on indicators, and 
holds workshops for projects/sponsors. There was also an audit on data quality. Evaluations, along 
with practical experience, are highlighting some issues and concerns over the value of some 
indicators. As a result, in some cases, changes are being made to the indicator definitions. Key 
concerns are in the following areas.  
                                                     
36
 ECA (2017a) op. cit. 
37
 Evaluations and assessment of the indicators are not simply informing Cohesion policy processes. It should 
also be recognised that the PF is being implemented against a background where domestic policy interventions 
are also working with performance measurement and indicator systems. For example, Austria plans to use 
synergies across policy areas, as other Austrian actors are also working on developing and improving 
performance measurement and indicator systems. Examples include the Ministry of Agriculture (how to measure 
the impact of environmental measures) and the Austrian Research Promotion Agency FFG. 
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(iii) New areas of intervention 
As has already been noted, establishing robust indicators and targets is particularly problematic in 
FDVHVZKHUHWKHUHLVQRWDµWUDFNUHFRUG¶WRGUDZRQIRUVHWting the indicators and targets.  
(iii) µ6RIW¶LQWHUYHQWLRQV 
The specificity and complexity of VRPH µVRIWHU¶ LQWHUYHQWLRQV PDNe it difficult to find appropriate 
indicators that directly relate to the planned scope of planned intervention, particularly as there is 
often a lack of reliable data sources to use as baselines (e.g. in Pomorskie). In Pomorskie, µVRIWHU¶
interventions under RTDI, SME support or education can be problematic ± the specificity and 
complexity of these interventions made it difficult to find appropriate indicators that would directly 
relate to the planned scope of planned intervention, particularly as there is often a lack of reliable data 
sources to use as baselines. For these types of intervention, it can be necessary to have quality-
based indicators that are context specific and agreed between the EC and the MA on a programme-
by-programme basis, requiring substantial capacity-building on both sides. According to Finland, the 
PF is best suited for measuring TOs that produce tangible quantifiable outputs, as opposed to soft 
interventions. These are for example TOs related to business support and infrastructure development. 
TOs related to RTDI, and skills and knowledge development are more difficult, because the results 
cannot be captured only on numeric terms and the funded projects are very different to each other. 
Because of this, the numeric indicators are more difficult to define for capturing the real results or 
become more ambiguous, leaving room for interpretation. Consequently, their reporting becomes 
more inconsistent and inaccurate. 
(iii) Complex interventions 
As has been discussed even LQ DSSDUHQWO\ µVWUDLJKW IRUZDUG¶ DUHDV RI LQWHUYHQWLRQ VHWWLQJ XVHIXO
indicators and milestones has proved challenging. The challenges faced are amplified for more 
complex interventions, e.g. Integrated Territorial Initiatives (ITIs)38 and Financial Instruments (FIs) 
(Austria, Czech Republic, Pomorskie, Portugal and England). FIs and territorial instruments such 
as ITIs, Community-led Local Development (CLLD) and urban development strategies (France, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Slovakia) appear also to be less suited for the PF.  
x $XVWULD¶V3ULRULW\$[LVVXSSRUWVPHDsures encouraging cooperation between cities with their 
surrounding areas. The progress of these types of interventions are difficult to measure. The 
Priority consists of diverse and complex projects, therefore any effective measurement of 
performance would have to take place at project level. 
x In Pomorskie, there are special provisions for FIs in the PF and there were additional 
discussions between the Ministry and the MAs in setting output indicators for FIs - assessing 
progress towards financial and physical targets in grant-based approaches is more 
straightforward than in loans, guarantees etc. where funding can revolve several times. 
x ,Q3RUWXJDO,7,VFRQWULEXWHWRDZLGHUDQJHRI72VDQGDUHµVSUHDG¶DURXQGDUDQJHRI3ULRULW\
Axes (under various OPs and Funds). Even in cases where the actions under a specific ITI 
fulfil (or even exceed) all the targets, if the Priority Axis as a whole does not deliver on its PF 
target, the whole axis is penalised, and the ITI thus may get affected. A possible solution 
                                                     
38
 The ITI interventions implemented are contributing to the achievement of the COI. 
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could be a single dedicated axis for ITIs, but this would make the whole system completely 
inflexible.  
(iii) Interventions relying on major projects 
It appears that even support for infrastructure is challenging in a PF context, e.g. under TO7 
(transport), due to its comparatively back-ended nature in terms of expenditure and delivery of outputs 
(Croatia, Greece, Sweden, Wales). While the PF is easy to define for infrastructure projects, the 
risk of not achieving the milestones is high. Reliance on a few key major projects, such as in the 
Slovak Integrated Infrastructure OP, can also be risky. Large, complex projects with extensive 
administrative procedures and bureaucratic obstacles have also proved to be challenging for PF 
targets, e.g. in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Wales. For instance, in Slovenia, climate change 
mitigation measures and anti-flood infrastructure are complicated projects, involving a lot of permits, 
regulation, complex project planning and implementation, resulting in slow progress. Thus, there is no 
GLUHFWFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQµHDV\WRGHILQH¶DQGµHDV\WRDFKLHYH¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQG3RPRUVNLHSRLQWV
out that transport infrastructure and waste management interventions are relatively standardised 
and commonly used, therefore are more suited to a quantitative, standardised indicator system. 
2.2.3 Reliability of data 
Even if indicators are suitable and milestones/targets have been set appropriately, there is the 
question of the reliability of the reported data. In order to have assurance about the quality of the 
data reported in the context of the PF, DG REGIO is carrying out Performance Data Reliability 
Audits (PDRA).39 In early 2016, it developed an audit methodology and drafted an Enquiry Planning 
Memorandum (EPM) on the PDRA. The PDRA focuses on the reliability of data, not on the actual 
progress in reaching the PF milestones and targets. It covers financial and output indicators in the 
PF under the ERDF, but can also look at indicators more widely where appropriate (e.g. where there 
was nothing reported under indicators included in the PF). 
,Q WKH ILUVWKDOIRI'*5(*,2¶V8QLW&$XGLW ,,VHOHFWHG WKUHHSLORW23VUHJLRQV WR WHVW WKHLU
audit approach: the Nordrhein-Westfalen ERDF OP); the Nord-Pas-de-Calais ERDF and ESF OP; 
and the West Wales and the Valleys ERDF OP. 
The PDRA used data from the most recent AIRs available, which were from 2015 at the time of pilot 
audits. The selection of pilot OPs was constrained by the fact that few 2015 AIRs contained any 
progress data in their PFs. 
The result of the PDRA was positive but highlighted a number of issues. 
x Missing IT interface for beneficiaries, i.e. the requirement of e-Cohesion not fulfilled. This 
means that data is entered by MA/IB, which can lead to errors 
x No automatic data extraction possible. Even if the reported data are correct, it has to be 
transferred into AIRs manually, which creates risks. 
x Insufficiently clear definition of indicators. Indicators need to be understood correctly and 
in the same way by all users. In one case, for the indicator, COI26 (number of enterprises 
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 It has to be noted that the PDRA is at an early stage and the initial results are internal to the EC. IQ-Net 
fieldwork research has only identified some preliminary findings. 
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cooperating with research institutions) has been interpreted differently by different actors. 
Some included enterprises that had the intention to cooperate, but were not cooperating yet. 
x Lack of audit trail. In some cases, data has been modified in IT systems, but the systems do 
not register by whom and when this was carried out.40  
Overall, the audit approach was assessed positively and it will therefore be continued. In order to 
extend the approach to more cases, the Audit Unit carried out a risk assessment on the basis of the 
AIR 2016 data. It plans to carry out further PDRAs in 18 OPs until the end of 2018. Of these, 14 cases 
had already been selected at the time of the interview. The Audit Unit plans to combine these audits 
with other system audits where possible. 
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 European Commission (2017) Enquiry Planning Memorandum on Performance Data Reliability Audit (PDRA), 
presentation at INTERACT Audit Authority network meeting, Malta, 14 June 2017 and interview with DG REGIO, 
Unit C.3 Audit II, 9 November 2017. 
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3. IMPLEMENTATION: PREPARING FOR THE PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW 2019 
The overall PF is linked to a Performance Review, carried out by DG REGIO in 2019. If the 
Performance Review shows the milestones set in the PF have been met a, Performance Reserve 
equivalent to six percent RIWKH23¶VIXQGLQJ made available for use.41 The first Performance Review 
of the 2014-20 programme period will take place in 2019, based on achievements up to the end of 
2018. 
3.1 Progress and challenges 
At this stage, it is still early for programmes to comment on the targets that have/have not met. 
Although previous IQ-Net research noted timely progress on the PF, in line with satisfactory project 
generation and selection, and good financial progress,42 there is significant versatility in target 
achievement. In several cases, actual progress in implementing measures had not yet been 
expressed in PF indicators at the end of 2016, the cut-off date for the most recent AIRs. 
In several cases, many (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Pomorskie, Slovakia, 
Slovenia) or most (England, Scotland, Wales) values for PF indicators were still at zero at the end 
of 2016. However, progress made against the milestones and targets for the PF varies naturally 
between Priorities, and most programme authorities remain optimistic and the PF indicators are 
considered to be generally on track (Austria, England, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Pomorskie, Sweden, 
Vlaanderen, Wales). In Vlaanderen, for instance, only one indicator (COI31 - number of households 
with improved energy consumption classification) still stands at zero, while others progressed well. 
COI38 (open space created or rehabilitated in urban areas) has already reached 340 percent of its 
milestone value. 
In some cases, there are challenges in individual thematic areas or with specific types of 
interventions. Some of these areas reflect fields of intervention that have not previously 
received support, such as poverty, or where the type of support has materially altered e.g. 
innovation centres (Scotland). Some examples of Thematic Objectives (TOs) that have been 
mentioned as challenging by IQ-Net programme authorities include: 
x TO2 ± ICT (England, País Vasco, Slovenia, Sweden). In Slovenia, the demand for Cohesion 
policy funding decreased due to larger private investments than expected. In Sweden, the 
outputs of implemented operations are not expected to be reported until later into the 
programme period. In England, the related State aid scheme expired in 2015 and the process 
of a new State aid notification delayed implementation. This resulted in a programme 
modification. 
x TO4 ± low-carbon (England, País Vasco, Sweden, Wales). This is a new area of intervention 
in several cases. In England, many early applicants failed at the outline stage, as they were 
not compatible with the OP, in part due to programme managers having limited experience in 
delivering low-carbon activity. 
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 It can be argued that the Performance Reserve is not SDLGDVLWKDVDOUHDG\EHHQLQFOXGHGLQWKH23V¶
allocations. 
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 Lehuraux T (2017) Gathering Implementation Speed: The Progression of Structural Funds Programmes, 
Summer 2017, IQ-Net Review Paper 40(1). 
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x TO5 ± climate change adaptation (England, Slovenia). In Slovenia, the implementation of 
anti-flood measures is very complex, requiring demanding environmental procedures and the 
UHTXLUHPHQWWRLQYROYHFLWL]HQV¶LQLWLDWLYHV,Q(QJODQGWKH0$HVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKH3)WDUJHWV
for 2023 were based on incorrect assumptions and required a programme modification. 
In other cases progress has been affected by delayed starts to the Programmes. The late approval of 
the EU regulations and delegated acts led to delays for many OPs. In the Czech Republic, 
considerable delays with the launch of 2014-20 period mean that milestones will be difficult to achieve 
by the end of 2018. Instead, they argue, for only using targets for 2023. In some cases, the approach 
to project generation, specifically involving a preparatory phase, has meant that funds have 
been slower to be absorbed in the early stages of the OP. The Nordrhein-Westfalen ERDF OP 
allocates funding mainly via competitive or project calls. As a result, it has been slower to commit 
funding than would be the case if public authorities were simply allocating funding to projects which 
were already planned. In a number of cases, milestones and targets appear to have been set too 
KLJKPDNLQJSURJUHVVOHVVµYLVLEOH¶. For example, in Croatia, operational level administrators have 
warned that in some cases the targets set in the PF were too optimistic. Similarly, in the Czech 
Integrated Regional OP, some milestones and targets were too high and had to be reduced as part of 
programme revisions. In other cases the poor selection of targets means progress is not well 
reflected. In Denmark, there have been issues surrounding Priority Axis 4, which focuses on low-
carbon and energy efficiency. The MA acknowledged a lack of familiarity with this thematic area and 
the potential beneficiaries involved, resulting in certain targets being incorrectly estimated.  
Often, the regulatory frameworks set by the EU and Member States result in implementation 
challenges that impact on the PF progress. However, these relate to programme implementation 
progress more widely and are not specific to the PF. Table 4 lists a number of examples.43 
Table 4: Regulatory and operational aspects influencing performance levels (examples) 
Regulatory 
requirements 
 
State Aid rules (England, Greece, Vlaanderen) 
Public procurement procedures (e.g. Greece, Pomorskie) 
Complex financial control and monitoring requirements acting as disincentive 
(England) 
Involvement of 
IBs  
IB selection (Greece) 
IB role and competences (ITIs in Nordrhein-Westfalen) 
High number of IBs and resulting complexity (Slovakia)  
Domestic 
issues 
Protracted term procedures for drafting and adopting strategic documents (Croatia) 
Broad focus of Priority Axes (Slovakia) 
Implementing new/revised electronic systems for monitoring and programme 
management (England, Portugal) 
Domestic co-funding challenges (Scotland) 
Source: IQ-Net research. 
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 For a more detailed overview of challenges with programme implementation see Michie R and Dozhdeva V 
(2017) Halfway there? Taking stock of ESIF programme implementation, IQ-Net Review Paper 41(1), European 
Policies Research Centre Delft. 
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3.2 Managing preparations for the Performance Review  
Research indicates that review management involves six actions: coordination of responsibilities; 
awareness raising; forecasting; data validation, risk management; and on-going monitoring.  
3.2.1 Coordination of responsibilities  
Oversight and coordination responsibilities are set and clarified (Austria, England, Greece, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen). For example, in Austria the MA is responsible, with a strong complementary 
role played by the monitoring body (based at the ERP-Fund at Austria Wirtschaftsservice). In 
England, as the review is carried out at Member State level, the MA anticipates that the responsible 
national-level authority, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, will be 
coordinating the review, with input from the MAs. In Greece, the MAs are responsible for the data 
provision, and the National Coordination Authority is performing coordination tasks. In Nordrhein-
Westfalen, it is the ERDF OP MA which is leading on preparations for the Performance Review, in 
cooperation with the IB. 
3.2.2 Awareness raising 
Steps are taken to alert relevant authorities and officials to the upcoming review and the need 
to initiate preparations (Croatia, Sweden). Part of this process is to encourage the early 
identification of problems or changes (Croatia),44 and, more generally, to open channels of 
communication, ensuring a good flow and exchange of information. For example, in Sweden there 
KDYHEHHQSURGXFWLYHZRUNVKRSVDQGVHPLQDUV WR µFDWFKZKDW LVKDSSHQLQJ¶XQGHUHDFK72ZKLFK
has helped to inform views of progress. In addition, external evaluations have been looking at each 
TO.  
3.2.3 Forecasting 
Efforts are made to forecast where the OPs will be in terms of milestones. In Greece, a 
preliminary report at national level forecasts progress with programme indicators, and further work will 
review operations that contribute to the indicators. This involves cooperation between the Greek 
Special Service for Strategic Planning and Evaluation (EYSSA), the Special Service for Coordination 
of Implementation (EYSE) and the MA. In December 2017, a thematic workshop will take place in 
order to communicate the significant issues to the Greek MAs. In País Vasco, a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the likely achievement of indicators was undertaken through an external 
evaluation, and a further evaluation will be carried out to support preparations. The first is an 
evaluation of the achievement of indicators using data on projects selected due to the absence of 
certified expenditure, which was conducted to feed into the Progress Report and AIR 2016, and the 
second will be a mid-term evaluation conducted in 2019 to DVVHVVWKH23¶V3)XVLQJGDWDDW the end 
of 2018. In Pomorskie, the MA gathered data on risks and identifying delays (see Table 5). 
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 Also in Croatia, the MA and Coordination body has notified IBs and advised them to, if necessary, relocate the 
funds among specific objectives. 
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Table 5: Preparations for the Performance Review in Pomorskie 
 
The monitoring and evaluation system for the Pomorskie OP (SL 2014) is the database for 
data from the MA and beneficiaries. The database is continuously updated and reports with 
financial information are prepared on a monthly basis. More extensive reports on the 
implementation of the OP are prepared once a year. In addition, evaluation reports based on 
the evaluation plan for Pomorskie are prepared periodically.  
Thus, the indicators for the PF and for the programme more widely are collected regularly and 
are constantly monitored. Data are obtained directly from the beneficiaries. Aggregate 
performance indicators are prepared once a year by the MA, and form an integral part of the 
AIR. 
In order to properly assess the implementation of the PF, and increase its strategic value, 
additional elements affecting the performance against some targets are taken into account. In 
a situation where the realisation of PF proved to be at risk, additional information was used 
which allowed assessment of the factors behind different levels of achievement.  
MA actions so far were aimed at gathering information on risks and identifying delays and their 
causes. Several of these factors lay outside the control of the Member State (e.g. changing 
market conditions, new legislation).  
In order to minimise the risk of not achieving targets, the MA also took into account the 
number of contracts signed, the number of training sessions with Beneficiaries held etc. This 
made it possible to assess the real risk of reaching PF targets and to take action to address 
these risks. 
 
 
3.2.4 Data validation 
Ensuring the validity of data is part of preparations. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, extensive 
financial/output control work is being conducted and a management tool for forecasting whether they 
are likely to meet each PF goal was developed. A detailed assessment is undertaken, focussing on 
ensuring that proof is available to underpin all the data, in order to ensure that no objections are 
raised to particular blocks of data, which could result in data being challenged or declared invalid. For 
example, in the casH RI LQGLFDWRUV RI µQXPEHU RI ILUPV VXSSRUWHG RU UHDFKHG¶ WKH 0$ DQG ,%V DUH
ensuring that the dates of any advisory meetings are recorded.  
3.2.5 Risk management 
Programme authorities have worked with partners to identify areas of risk and subsequently 
work to boost take up. For example, in Sweden, where an area was identified that slower to progress, 
the authorities have been proactive in encouraging projects ± asking what is happening, identifying 
areas where there may be outputs/results which may not have been reported yet, and taking 
measures to enhance programme progress (workshops, seminars), and providing information. All of 
these efforts have resulted in more project applications. Similarly, Nordrhein-Westfalen works on 
accelerating the implementation of its OP Priority Axis 4. It encourages local authorities to apply for 
funding for integrated urban development strategies by undertaking significant communication work 
with the local authorities, aimed at generating interest in the call.  
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3.2.6 On-going monitoring 
As the PF is embedded in wider programme monitoring and evaluation systems, online 
monitoring systems can provide complete indicator information, and programme managers regularly 
monitor indicators, part of which is predicting progress towards the review targets (Austria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, Slovenia, Sweden, Wales). On this basis, at present, some IQ-
Net authorities do not see the necessity for additional measures to prepare for the Performance 
Review. In England, the MA is continuing to measure its outputs in line with the PF and this will feed 
into any Performance Review.45 In Wales, the MA has a detailed forecast of where the OP will be, and 
each operation has a quarterly forecast. This features in each management meeting and the 
monitoring committee discusses it at every (quarterly) meeting. In Slovenia, line ministries in their role 
as IBs are monitoring the progress of measures and the achievement of OP indicators (and PF 
values) regularly. The MA is undertaking monitoring and controlling in the framework of the regular 
implementation report that is sent to the Slovenian Government, the Slovenian Parliament, the EC 
and to cohesion regions. 
3.3 Revisions of milestones and targets 
Revisions to the milestone and target values of the PF are being considered by several IQ-Net 
programme authorities, but this is discouraged by the EC.46 Any request for modifications are 
considered by the EC on a case-by-case basis based on the relevant legislation. Annex II of the CPR 
LQGLFDWHVZKDWPD\FRQVWLWXWHDµGXO\MXVWLILHGFDVH¶IRUDPHQGPHQWVQRWDEO\ 
x a significant change in the economic, environmental and labour market conditions in a 
Member State or region; or 
x the information recorded by the body preparing the programme has been found to be based 
on incorrect assumptions leading to under- or over-estimation of targets or milestones. 
Most importantly, if the revision aims only to align the milestones and targets with actual 
SHUIRUPDQFHWKH(&ZLOOQRWFRQVLGHUWKLVDVDµGXO\MXVWLILHGFDVH¶. 
Modifications have been, to date, justified either by changes in the underpinning socio-economic 
conditions/challenges or are of a more technical nature, including the recent technical adjustment 
of the Member State envelopes. Examples in IQ-Net programmes so far include the following. 
x In Scotland, changes have been envisaged from the start and a programme review took place 
in 2017. The Scottish programmes were initially (pre-Brexit) designed to run for three years, 
following which there would be a programme review. Strategic and labour market changes 
mean that adjustments to both the scope and allocations are required. Changes aimed at 
ensuring full allocation of the programmes and to address lower levels of absorption, 
particularly in the Highlands and Islands. 
x In Sweden, there was discussion with the EC about some change. However, the decision was 
taken not to change the milestones or targets, but simply the way they were expressed in 
absolute numbers rather than as a percentage change. 
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 Although, with the proposed departure of the UK from the EU, the MA is uncertain of the future of the England 
ERDF programme beyond March 2019, so has not made any firm preparations for the Performance Review in 
2019. 
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 European Commission (2014) op. cit., p. 14. 
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x In Vlaanderen and the Slovak Research and Innovation OP, some changes have been made 
to milestones and targets to reflect changes in the OP financial allocations.  
Specific changes to indicators are also addressed in Slovenia (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Changes to indicators proposed in Slovenia 
 
3ULRULW\$[LV,&7,QLQYHVWPHQWSULRULW\µexpansion of broadband services and 
introduction of high-speed nHWZRUNV¶WKHUHVSRQVLEOH,%0LQLVWU\RI3XEOLF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ
carried out a demand assessment for commercial interest in the deployment of broadband 
networks over the next three years. This showed strong commercial interest, which 
significantly changed the basic assumptions on which the Priority was based. Hence, not all 
SODQQHGIXQGV¼PLOOLRQZLOOEH necessary to achieve the objectives and can therefore be 
decreased. Therefore the MA has proposed changing the funding allocation and of milestones 
for 2018 and 2023. 
Priority Axis 4 (CO2,QLQYHVWPHQWSULRULW\µHQHUJ\HIILFLHQF\PHDVXUHLQUHVLGHQtial 
buildings, owned by public authorities¶LQGLFDWRUVZLOOQHHGWREHFKDQJHG7KHQXPEHURI
buildings that are to be renovated with the objective of energy efficiency was set too high due 
to the fact that public authorities do not own enough building (block of flats) for renovation. In 
the proposals for OP changes the quantity of flats that are to be renovated and the funds for 
renovation have been reduced. The additional funds will be committed to sustainable urban 
mobility measures within ITIs, implemented in 11 Slovenian cities. 
3ULRULW\$[LV&OLPDWHFKDQJHDGDSWDWLRQ,QLQYHVWPHQWSULRULW\µSURPRWLQJLQYHVWPHQWV
IRUFOLPDWHFKDQJHDGDSWDWLRQ¶, costs of investments are much higher than initially envisaged. 
Therefore the number of planned interventions had to be reduced, which resulted in the 
revision of indicators, including the PF indicators. 
 
The prospect of future changes will partly depend on whether the proposed regulatory changes 
that would allow the inclusion of partially completed interventions will materialise. It is also 
anticipated that changes to elements of the PF will continue in the future. For example, the Welsh MA 
has undertaken a review of all indicators, and changes are planned for the next monitoring committee 
(December 2017). Similar plans are emerging in Portugal. At the moment, political guidance is being 
awaited to proceed to reviewing the OPs and including revisions (which has already been agreed with 
the EC), also the revision of indicators which are considered as no longer realistic. In Greece, only 
minimal changes have been made to date (particularly concerning ESF), but a review is planned for 
2018 in which further changes are expected. In Finland, changes to the milestones could become 
topical. The adjustments on milestones would concern the two indicators, in which target achievement 
LVVWLOOXQFHUWDLQµWRWDOHOLJLEOHH[SHQGLWXUH¶DQGµQHZ5	'MREV¶ 
Some programme authorities have not had to consider changes to the PF and are not considering 
changes in the future (Nordrhein-Westfalen). Others have tried to make amendments but the EC did 
not accept the proposed changes (Denmark, Croatia), see Table 7. 
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Table 7: Proposed changes not accepted 
 
The Danish Business Authority (MA) considers some of the targets set to be inaccurate and 
wish to review them but the EC has been reluctant to explore this at this stage. At the annual 
review meeting, the MA gave a SUHVHQWDWLRQWRGLUHFWWKH(&¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWZRSDUWLFXODU
Priority Axes (one under the ESF OP) where they feel they may encounter problems to 
release the reserve. The EC advised waiting to see if performance may improve in the future, 
rather than amending targets. In some areas for the ERDF OP, the outputs are sufficient but 
meeting the financial targets for expenditure will prove difficult. It is a situation where there are 
projects with a substantial output but with low individual costs. 
 
 
The MA in Croatia has tried to change some technical issues and errors (e.g. base values of 
indicators), but the EC stressed that is not possible to meet this request before 1 January 
2019. Amendments to the OP, which were presented and approved by the monitoring 
committee in November 2016, included technical corrections of the indicator system. 
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4. EXPERIENCES OF WORKING WITH THE PERFORMANCE 
FRAMEWORK: VALUE AND LIMITATIONS 
Views on the value and utility of the PF have differed between the IQ-Net programme managers from 
the outset (see Figure 6). Previous (2016) IQ-Net research highlighted that a relatively small 
proportion of IQ-Net programme authorities had a positive opinion; many held negative views and a 
significant number considered that it would have minimal effect.47 
Figure 6: Performance framework ± IQ-Net assessment of impact of reforms (percent) 
 
Source: Bachtler J, Mendez C and Polverari L (2016) Ideas and Options for Cohesion Policy Post-2020, IQ-Net 
Thematic Paper 38(2), p. 24. 
Particular concerns were that the approach could potentially constrain ambition LQ IDYRXURID µVDIH
DSSURDFK¶ and become an additional administrative burden, placing undue emphasis on financial 
absorption. Many expressed concerns about the achievement of 2018 targets. One IQ-Net 
programme manager observed that the PF LVµPHDVXULQJWRRHDUO\RUWKHZURQJWKLQJ¶ 
Although views on the value and utility of the PF vary between IQ-Net programme managers, result 
orientation more widely is viewed predominantly positively. An IQ-Net survey of a sample of 20 
programme authorities from 12 Member States (see Figure 7) shows that the increased focus on 
targets and indicators in the 2014-20 programme period is deemed to be helpful for the delivery 
of the programmes by over two-thirds of respondents. However, there are also some more critical 
voices, e.g. citing the added administrative effort.  
Views about the PF are more mixed. Some Member States have previously noted a positive 
impression of the new PF (Croatia, Portugal); others called for improvements (France) or questioned 
the value of the exercise (Austria, Denmark).48 Among IQ-Net programme authorities, over half of the 
respondents find that the PF is a valuable tool for the result orientation. However, only about a 
third of interviewed programme managers agree that it is also useful for strategic programme 
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 Bachtler J, Mendez C and Polverari L (2016) Ideas and Options for Cohesion Policy Post-2020, IQ-Net 
Thematic Paper 38(2), European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow. 
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 Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2017) Reshaping the EU Budget and Cohesion Policy: Carrying On, 
Doing less, Doing More or Radical Redesign?, paper prepared for the 38th meeting of the EoRPA Regional Policy 
Research Consortium at Ross Priory, Loch Lomondside on 1-3 October 2017. 
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management. Finally, the majority of respondents do not think that the Performance Reserve has an 
incentive effect for programme managers. 
Figure 7: Views about performance-related elements of result orientation in 2014-20 
 
Source: IQ-Net research based on 20 respondents from 12 Member States. 
The following sections examines these and other issues, discussing areas where value is derived 
from working with the PF. It points out where the process is seen as having less value and has limits 
on its role of supporting efficient and effective implementation of programmes and programme results.  
4.1 Value in strategic programme management and driving result orientation 
Initial EC expectations were that the PF would strengthen the result orientation in the programmes, 
support better steering and guiding of programme implementation, provide realistic, comparable 
targets; promote internal exchanges and dialogue; and act as an incentive for the programme to 
µGHOLYHU¶ In practice, authorities administering the PF also identify some beneficial elements. Sweden, 
England, Croatia and Finland, for example, found aspects of the process to be useful for focussing 
efforts on strategic planning, delivery and capturing results. In doing so, it makes it clear that 
programmes cannot simply wait until the end of the programme period to think about results.  
4.1.1 Enhancing result orientation 
The aim of the PF was that it would strengthen the result orientation and focus in the 
programmes and this has been evident at various stages of programme management. The PF 
is viewed as supportive in enhancing the result focus in programme planning by some IQ-Net 
programme authorities. Sweden, England, Croatia and Finland, for example, found the aspects of the 
process to be useful for focussing efforts on strategic planning, delivery and capturing results. In 
doing so, it makes it clear that programmes cannot simply wait until the end of the programme period 
to think about results. The experience in Greece with the PF so far shows that it is an important 
instrument which helps the MAs define objectives, and develop a logic based on what can be 
achieved. In Finland, the PF assisted in drafting the intervention logic and focusing on measurable 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
The Performance Reserve is a useful incentive for
programme managers
PF is useful for strategic programme management
PF is a valuable tool for the result orientation
Increased focus on targets & indicators is helpful for
delivery of programmes
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
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activities best delivering the programme strategy by focussing the programme on measureable 
outputs and targets. 
4.1.2 Tool for strategic management 
The PF has gone on to provide MAs and IBs with a tool for improving the strategic management 
and effective implementation of the programme (e.g. Table 8). For central level coordinators of 
Cohesion policy, the PF has supported their efforts to encourage MAs to better plan OP activities 
&]HFK 5HSXEOLF ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH 3) KDV LQWURGXFHG DQ HOHPHQW RI µFRPSHWLWLRQ¶ EHWZHHQ MAs 
(Greece). PF targets focuses attention of MAs and ERDF recipients on the delivery of results at 
programme and project levels. It can also provide useful data to inform any changes to the OP. For 
example, the Performance Review is felt to retain a focus on the overall intervention logic of 
programmes (Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece). It is a useful guide to decide any potential 
changes to the OP (England, Finland). The PF is considered XVHIXODVDQµHDUO\ZDUQLQJPHFKDQLVP
for the MA (Croatia), RU DV D SODQQLQJ WRRO RU µFKHFN-SRLQW¶ RQ WKH ZD\ WR GHOLYHULQJ UHVXOWV &]HFK
Republic). In Denmark, it provided an additional tool in project selection (Denmark, Finland, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen). 
During monitoring, the PF, and frequent discussions on progress towards milestones and targets, 
provides the MA and implementing bodies with a tool for self-reflection, which helps them to monitor 
whether they have succeeded on focusing on actions that contribute to achievement of the OP 
strategy (Finland). ParticuODUO\IRUWKHPRUHµVLPSOH¶LQWHUYHQWLRQV(e.g. transport infrastructure, waste 
management, which are suited to quantitative, standardised indicator systems) the PF has helped in 
assessing the progress of some of the programme's objectives accurately (Pomorskie).  
Table 8: Performance Framework as a tool in Denmark and Finland 
 
In Denmark, the MA stated that the PF has been helpful in making it easier to process 
applications as these are closely linked to the indicators and targets. This is supported by the 
REVHUYDWLRQVRIWKHSURJUDPPHV¶HYDOXDWRUZKRQRWHGWKDWWKHEHQHILFLDULHVDUHPRUHLQIRUPHG
than previously. The PF gives a clearer view of what is happening in the programmes and 
allows this to be measured. 
 
In Finland, the PF has provided an additional tool for project selection and monitoring for 
implementing bodies. During project evaluation, the implementing bodies compare the content 
of a proposal to indicators, and assess whether the project will contribute to indicator 
achievement. If the project does not contribute to the indicators, it will score a lower rating. In 
West Finland, for example, the implementing bodies committed to funding only project 
proposals that contribute positively to indicators, during the project preparation stage, the 
implementing bodies will coach the applicants to shape the project plan so that it will produce 
more results contributing to the core indicators. During programme implementation, the PF has 
provided the LPSOHPHQWLQJERGLHVZLWKDWRROWRµGHPDQG¶UHVXOWVIURPWKHSURMHFWVWRLPSURYH
their quality and contribution to the programme strategy 
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4.1.3 Building commitment to targets 
Portugal notes that the focus on targets and indicators has filtered down to projects, which 
ensures a greater level of commitment to the targets at this, most critical, level. In each call, the MA is 
clear with applicants what results and targets are expected, which has helped build focus from the 
outset. In Scotland the result orientation, of which the PF is part, is leading to difficult questions being 
asked of project sponsors about whether projects achieve what they are actually intended to achieve. 
In Finland, it is linked to shifts in the make up of projects and has led indirectly to increased business 
participation in projects, where projects without participating companies do not contribute to the core 
indicators set for the ERDF Priority Axes 1 (Competitiveness of SMEs) and 2 (Production and 
utilisation of new knowledge and skills).  
4.1.4 Builds political awareness of targets 
The PF has been linked to shifts in political roles in the process. In Pomorskie, the exercise is viewed 
as useful in that it has raised awareness among policy makers and politicians about programme 
outputs and achievements. This has also raised expectations, particularly among politicians. In 
Pomorskie, regional elections are likely to coincide with the announcement of the results of the 
Performance Review, and these results could be used in political campaigning. In the Danish case, 
the PF is considered to have helped to prevent political interference in the programme. In the past, 
politicians have tended tR µchange their minds and want to launch their own strategies, using ESI 
Funds and their strategies are always delayed thus delaying project calls to coincide with them¶
However with the PF in place and there is a clear message that delays/changing direction will prevent 
access to the Performance Reserve. Similarly, in Vlaanderen, it is no longer possible for politicians to 
launch very specific calls for proposal, which do not add much to the PF targets. 
As the preceding points highlight the PF is identified as having a valued role at various stages in 
programme development and delivery and also at various levels involved (see Table 9 and Figure 8).  
Table 9: Performance Framework benefits at different levels 
Level Benefits Examples 
Project 
 
 
x Results focus is filtering down to project level 
x Greater commitment to targets 
x Project sponsors are being challenged to think about what 
they aim to achieve 
Portugal, Scotland 
Programme  x Result-focused planning, not only during programming 
process 
x Guide to decide possible changes in OP 
England, Finland, 
France 
Central x Supported central-level efforts to encourage MAs to better 
plan OP activities 
x ,QWURGXFHGDQHOHPHQWRIµFRPSHWLWLRQ¶EHWZHHQ0$V 
Czech Republic, 
Greece 
Political x Raised awareness among policy-makers and politicians 
about programme outputs and achievements  
x Helped to prevent political interference in the programme 
Denmark, 
Pomorskie, 
Vlaanderen 
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Figure 8: Beneficial impacts/influence of the Performance Framework at stages of the 
programme management and implementation process 
 
However, a number of challenges are also identified which have led some authorities to: 
x question aspects/elements of the process; 
x question the added value of the exercise; and  
x propose areas that could be changed in the immediate future and longer-term.  
Many of the practical challenges in establishing meaningful PF are already discussed in this paper, 
most notably in relation to setting indicators and targets. However, as programmes progress new 
issues gain prominence. Before examining these points in greater detail, it is important to emphasise 
that the PF is part of wider performance management systems. Consequently, some of the issues 
discussed in the following sections are not confined to the PF. Nevertheless, as a part of the 
performance management system that carries particular weight, and crucially, determines resources, 
these issues can be particularly keenly felt in relation to the PF, and distinct issues have also arisen 
leading to questions over the responsiveness and added value of the PF.  
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4.2 Limits and constraints in working with the Performance Framework 
4.2.1 Lack of flexibility and uncertainty ± not allowing programmes to 
accurately convey progress and respond to change 
The lack of flexibility in the PF is an issue highlighted by a number of IQ-Net Authorities for several 
reasons: 
x Difficulty in changing milestones and targets  
x Focus on completed actions 
x Tight focus on key targets building inflexibility into programmes  
x Uncertainty over Performance Reserve application 
(iii) Difficulty in changing milestones and targets  
There is a perceived lack of flexibility from the EC in allowing changes to the indicators/targets. 
The PF for the programmes were developed in 2013, setting targets for 2018 and beyond. This was 
felt to be a very early stage in the process when many variables influencing the programmes are not 
yet clear (Austria, Finland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Slovakia). The initial years of programme are difficult 
to predict. Further, the milestones and targets are unresponsive to changes in the external 
environment over the programme period and/or possible delays with OP implementation (e.g. 
Finland). In some cases, the milestones and targets were set too ambitiously and required 
amendments (e.g. Czech Integrated Regional OP). In the Welsh experience, the impression given by 
the EC when the PF was agreed was that the MA should µQRWZRUU\DERXWLWWRRPXFK¶DQGWRXVHD
µEHVWJXHVV¶given that targets would be easy to change in 2017. The message now seems to be that 
it will be difficult to change. 
(iii) Focus on completed actions 
Compounding concerns about the lack of flexibility and the impact of delays is the fact that, currently, 
the PF only takes into account completed actions (Czech Republic, Portugal, Wales). 
x In Portugal, despite delays in the launch of interventions, substantial progress has been made as 
a result of considerable effort, but this is still not reflected in PF indicators which only cover the 
outputs of actions implemented in full.49  
x The Czech Integrated Regional OP MA argues, instead, that would be more appropriate to take 
accomplished indicators into account, e.g. completed sections of a road, even though the whole 
road may not have been completed.  
This issue is currently addressed by a proposed amendment of Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No 215/2014. In order to allow for the inclusion of operations that have not yet been 
implemented in full, Art. 5(3) will be replaced by the following: 
                                                     
49
 µ«WKHPLOHVWRQHDQGWDUJHWIRUDQRXWSXWLQGLFDWRUVKDOOUHIHUWRRSHUDWLRQVZKHUHDOOWKHDFWLRQVOHDGLQJWR
outputs have been implemented in full¶VHH$rt. 5(3)of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 215/2014 
of 7 March 2014. 
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µFor all ESI Funds, except for the EMFF, the milestone and target for an output indicator shall refer to 
operations, where all the actions leading to outputs have been implemented in full, but for which not all the 
payments have necessarily been made, or to the values achieved by operations which have been started, 
but where some of the actions leading to outputs are still ongoing.¶50 
(iii) Tight focus on key targets building inflexibility into programmes  
The tight focus on key milestones and targets builds rigidity into the programmes, with the 
consequence of: 
x disadvantaging more innovative/experimental projects or less experienced/new applicants 
(England); e.g. in Finland there has been a noted professionalisation of the project application 
process and a resulting reduction in the diversity of applications;  
x generating µWHPSODWHG¶ SURMHFWV ZLWK QR LQQRYDWLYH RU IXQGDPHQWDOO\ QHZ IRUPV RI VXSSRUW DQG
non-investment measures, i.e. that can be realised quickly are preferred (Czech Republic); and 
x driving negative behaviours and leading to the approval of projects WKDWZLOOGHOLYHUWKHµQXPEHUV¶
(Wales) DQGµVDIH¶projects (Slovenia, England). 
(iii) Uncertainty over Performance Reserve application 
The considerable uncertainty over how the Performance Reserve will be applied is frustrating for 
many IQ-Net programme authorities (e.g. Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal). The flexibility for 
Member States to reallocate funding.51 Is not yet clear. Member States should be able to move non-
allocated PF funding, but will this be moved to different Priority Axes in the same of in different OPs? 
Will it need to cover the same thematic area, i.e. similar Priorities? And, crucially, how will this relate 
to regional categories or ring-fencing requirements (e.g. minimum allocations to specific TOs such as 
TO4 low-carbon)?  
4.2.2 Added value of the Performance Framework ± duplicating effort, lacking 
of positive incentive and presenting a narrow view of commitment not 
outputs  
Some IQ-Net programme managers argue that requirements of the PF would exist anyway; they 
highlight public pressure/interest in the programmes to maximise results in order to justify the 
relevance of the programme (Czech Republic, Denmark, Vlaanderen). For example, Vlaanderen were 
already putting more focus on indicators and targets in the selection process, so it can be assumed 
that the same results would have been achieved without PF.  
                                                     
50
 Draft Commission Implementing Regulation amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 215/2014 with regard 
to changes to the determination of milestones and targets for output indicators in the performance framework for 
the European Structural and Investment Funds. 
51
 The ECA concluded that, the Performance Review can at most result in a reallocation within the Member 
State. Reallocation of the Performance Reserve is performed at national level: funds can be reallocated to 
Priority Axes within an OP or can be reallocated to Priority Axes of other OPs of the Member State. There is 
therefore no risk for a Member States to lose EU funding. In previous reports, we already stated that it is a 
challenge to obtain good qualitative results from schemes where funds are pre-allocated among Member States. 
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(i) Decommitment / n+3 rules are sufficient 
Several programme managers (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Wales) point out that the existing n+3 rule 
already seeks to ensure that sufficient progress is made and incentivises performance to meet 
financial targets. Similarly, the Czech Integrated Regional OP MA notes that financial milestones / 
targets are in principle already mirrored in the n+3 rule, therefore financial milestones are regarded as 
useless and generate additional administrative workload. Also, the programmes already spend time 
and effort to measure progress.  
 
x For France, in terms of financial impact, compliance with the n+3 is seen as more important, 
as the financial impact of decommitment due to the n+3 rule is potentially bigger. Austria 
notes that the PF runs the risk of accentuating the n+3 challenges and breaking it down to the 
level of Priority Axis. As such it risks being viewed as simply an additional requirement, an 
administrative exercise potentially causing complex reprogramming of the whole OP. 
Additionally in Wales, it is felt that the PF runs the risk of undermining the annual review 
process ± what is the annual review for if it is not to review performance? It is also felt that the 
ongoing relationship with desk officers should also be on performance management. Thus, a 
strong focus on performance is already present through other means.  
(iii) Not acting as a positive incentive  
The QHJDWLYHµSXQLWLYH¶DSSURDFKRIWKH3), acting as a sanction rather than a positive incentive, is 
highlighted by a number of IQ-Net programme authorities (Austria, Poland, Portugal, France). In 
contrast to the approach used in 2007- ZKHUH WKH UHVHUYH ZDV EDVHG RQ DQ DGGLWLRQDO µSRW¶ RI
funding that could be accessed by the programmes, in 2014-WKHUH LVQR µDGGLWLRQDO¶ IXQGLQJ7KH
PF funds are part of the initial financial allocation to the OP, meaning the PF is seen as punishing by 
deducting money, rather that encouraging and rewarding. Some argue that as an incentive to 
improved programme management and implementation, the PF remains artificial because the 
milestones and targets can be adjusted to more achievable ones during the programme period, which 
waters down the aim of trying to achieve them in the first place.  
The effectiveness of the incentive is also diminished by the expectation that the EC will pay the 
reserve to all Member States, whether specific Priorities meet milestones or not. For example, a 
ECA report published 23 November 2017, suggests that the PF and the Performance Reserve is  
µunlikely to trigger a significant reallocation of Cohesion spending during the 2014-2020 period to 
better performing programmes. In particular, any reallocation will be within and/or between the 
programmes of the same Member States. [«] the way the Performance Reserve has been designed 
provides little incentive for a better result orientation of the OPs since it is mostly based on spending 
and outputs. Furthermore, the additional funding is definitively allocated even if milestones are not 
met in full by 2018 and can at most be reallocated within the Member State.¶ It concludes, µthe newly 
introduced suspensions and financial corrections for underperformance are a step in the right 
direction, but are subject to restrictive conditions and therefore unlikely to be applied in practice¶.52 
                                                     
52
 European Court of Auditors (2017b) op. cit., p. 9. 
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(iii) Presents a narrow partial view 
The award of the Performance Reserve on the basis of what is considered a narrow, partial view of 
what the programmes are achieving is a concern for some IQ-Net programme managers. A 2017 
ECA report presented a similar finding that the PF remains focused on spending and outputs, with 
hardly any result indicators included. This meant that the PF was not significantly more result-oriented 
than similar arrangements in the previous period. For many IQ-Net programme authorities, the PF can 
be considered a useful tool for measuring efficiency but limited utility for measuring 
effectiveness (Pomorskie, Scotland, Slovenia).53 As noted in Slovenia, PF indicators need to be 
simple and are not ill-suited to representing a wide range of Priority Axes, e.g. the number of 
supported SMEs cannot measure the effectiveness of the implemented measure. Further, PF only 
comprised of a few indicators and, thus, its wider role for in strategic management of the programmes 
is limited54 (Austria, Nordrhein-Westfalen:DOHV:DOHVDUJXHV WKDW WKH IRFXVRQ µHYHU\WKLQJEHLQJ
aggregated as outputs is a backward VWHS7KH0$LVµRQERDUG¶ZLWKWKHLGHDRIFRUHLQGLFDWRUVEXWLW
is overly complicated (e.g. for enterprise support) and it has created an emphasis on the PF and 
taken the emphasis away from actual results. ,Q (QJODQG WKH 0$¶V YLHZ LV WKDW WKH GHWDLOHG
information required under the PF about milestones and targets, down to investment priority level, 
does not particularly lend itself to a strategic approach. The PF cannot take the place of policy 
evaluation, which can provide a wider and more informed perspective on programme performance 
(Sweden). The performance and impact of programmes must be seen in a wider context as a number 
of policy tools and programmes (EU, national or regional) support territorial development from 
different angles.  
  
                                                     
53
 In order to ensure complementarity (Slovenia has one multi-Fund and multi-regional OP, covering all TOs; and 
one central MA) we need better IT support and a good overview on different sector policies, to be able to react 
quicker and better. Arguing that measuring output figures will not show the whole picture, Slovenia suggests that 
innovative and complementary actions are considered useful. Similarly, Scotland the most useful information 
comes from actually speaking to a business or person to find out what they money really achieved, i.e. through 
evaluation. The indicator focus of the PF does not reveal this story. There is a sense that the PF a step in the 
right direction, but is only measuring one dimension of performance. 
54
 In contrast, the wider sets of programme indicators, which do offer a wider few of progress, are criticised as 
being too numerous (Czech Republic), too detailed to be strategic (England), and difficult to measure (Finland). 
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Many MAs would like to see an end to the Performance Reserve (or a PF but no reserve) due to the 
administrative burdens and µred tape¶ that it generates for the MA and IB. In Denmark, for example, 
the MA does not consider the PF a useful feature for programming but, stressed that this is not a 
rejection of result orientation more widely, but purely of the PF. There is recognition of the value of a 
result orientation, but it needs to be done in the right way and the PF/Performance Reserve is not 
necessarily the way to do this. There is support for the general principle, but doubts about its 
application in a highly complex system such as Cohesion policy. Figure 9 draws together key issues 
highlighted in relation to establishing the PF and working with the PF in practice, which have been 
highlighted in this paper.  
Figure 9: Working with the Performance Framework 
 
Responding to these issues, IQ-Net programme managers make a number of recommendations 
which are set out as follows. 
(iii) Addressing administrative burden: 
Taking into account existing concerns over administrative burdens, any changes should not make 
the system more burdensome as this will prevent an insurmountable pressure on the OPs 
(England, Nordrhein-Westfalen). 
Greater clarity and guidance at the outset would enable all OPs to use the same assumptions in 
defining their PF and do appropriate planning (Portugal, Croatia). Ensure that OPs can start on time 
(Czech Republic) e.g. by providing all regulatory and guidance documents in advance of the 
ͻcomplexity of establishing the performance framework 
ͻadministrative burden of gathering and maintaining data 
ͻdesire for data to provide value to programmes  
Adressing administrative burden and complexity  
ͻchallenge in setting milestone and target values 
ͻdiffering interpretations of indicators 
ͻnumber of indicators in use undermining comparability 
ͻscope to use data and monitoring to inform programme development  
Maximising the value and quality of indicators and data 
ͻtarget setting undertaken too early in the process 
ͻdifficulty in changing targets 
ͻlack of information on how information will be used and how reserve will be allocated 
ͻlack of meaningful targets 
Improving flexibility and responsiveness 
ͻoverlap with n+3 and other monitoring and reporting 
ͻoverly focussed on efficiency issues  
ͻadds little understanding of the programme results 
 
Building added value 
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programme period, and by streamlining OP approval processes (including requirements in relation to 
the management and control system (Nordrhein-Westfalen). Greater clarity about how the information 
will be used would also be welcome (e.g. in Sweden). 
(iii) Maximising value and quality of indicators and data  
The quality and availability of data was identified as a major issue for a number of programmes. 
Programme managers highlighted the ongoing need to be careful not to set more targets than can be 
monitored and managed, and should not set targets for aspects over which they have very little 
control.55 Recommendations included: 
x selecting indicators which can easily be quantified ± which in turn implies the need to check 
ex ante the practicality of both indicator definition and targets set (Nordrhein-Westfalen);  
x reducing the number of indicators used (Czech Republic); and  
x expanding the use of common indicators for all the documents based on a single system of 
indicators (Greece, Nordrhein-Westfalen). 
Linked to the quality and availability of data and the information it provides, greater 
differentiation in the thematic application of the PF is recommended. For some programme 
managers, global application of the PF across the entire programme is not considered desirable. For 
example, the PF is not suitable for new instruments /new forms of support in the implementation 
system. For example, in the case of financial instruments, FIs, territorial investments the quality of 
new instruments should be given priority over speed of implementation (Czech Republic). The current 
system is not well suited to a long-term, strategic projects investments. 
(iv) Improving flexibility and responsiveness 
Change in the timing of target setting was considered helpful by a number of authorities. In 
particular, there should be more time allowed to undertake analyses to determine target values 
(Wales), especially where previous data and studies are lacking (Slovakia, Slovenia). The need for 
more timely advice on requirements for evidencing indicators was highlighted in Scotland. 
This is linked to concerns over the lack of flexibility in the PF, where recommendations included 
the following: 
x Any future approach needs to be less mechanistic, and take a more nuanced approach (e.g. 
enhanced data collection plus indicators plus evaluation findings) (Wales) 
x The centralised, national indicator approach for ERDF does not really tell individual MAs what 
they want to know, especially in devolved administrations (Scotland). 
x Time and flexibility is needed to adapt and learn and potentially change their PF targets. This 
is especially the case for new/innovative areas of intervention where it is important to allow for 
adjustments and fine tuning in the face of evolving needs as initial planning was probably 
carried out largely on the basis of expectations rather than experience (Portugal, Slovakia). 
x Nordrhein-Westfalen proposes allowing changes to the indicators/targets if there are 
unforeseen circumstances which lead to delays and to targets not being met.  
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 Calviño N (2016) Budget Focused on Results, presentation to the European Parliament CONT Committee, 24 
May 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/budget4results/news/BFOR_presentation_CONT_20160524.pdf 
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x The incentive should be more flexible and more binding than at the moment. This could 
mean, for example, that targets and milestones would have a certain flexibility but could not 
be changed during the programme period (Finland). This would help to react to the changes 
in the external environment during the seven year period, within the framework of the 
predefined PF. 
x Milestones and targets should be counted from accomplished indicators, not from 
accomplished projects (Czech Republic). 
(iii) Building added value 
Building system based on trust and encouragement, as opposed to negative/punitive 
approaches, would be valued by many IQ-Net programme managers. Any future PF should work 
in an encouraging, not µpunishing way¶ (Austria). There should be less rules and a reserve should be 
D µUHDO UHVHUYH¶DQGQRWDQDPRXQWRIPRQH\ LQFOXGHG LQ WKH LQLWLDOHQYHORSH)UDQFH7KH*HUPDQ
Länder advocate an approach that encourages and strengthens initiative, creativity and focus on the 
common good. Future implementation should be accompanied by dialogue with each region based on 
the idea of a strategic partnership. This dialogue should also contribute to simplifying programme 
implementation and reporting. Programme effectiveness should be appraised primarily on the basis of 
the results achieved. 
 Further, proposals include:  
x Using more flexible tools to assess performance (effectiveness). It is not possible to 
measure or quantify all interventions of the programme accurately, e.g. there are (innovative) 
approaches that cannot be represented with simple figures (Slovenia). 
x Incentivising performance could reach to project level. Currently there is no direct impact 
on projects for not reaching a certain target ± they do not receive extra funding if they perform 
well. To be a more effective tool for the result orientation there should be a closer link to 
project performance (Denmark).  
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
The result orientation, of which the PF is a part, was a step-change in the philosophy of Cohesion 
policy. In reviewing the negotiations, the EC stDWHG WKDW µHYHU\SURJUDPPHKDVD3)DJDLQVWZKLFK
SHUIRUPDQFH ZLOO EH DVVHVVHG¶ PDNLQJ LW µSRVVLEOH WR KDYH WUDQVSDUHQW UHSRUWLQJ DQG HYDOXDWH
SURJUHVVWRZDUGVSURJUDPPHREMHFWLYHV¶,QSUDFWLFHWKLVKDVEHHQFKDOOHQJLQJWRDFKLHYH'XULQJWKH
programming process, the main challenge when formulating PFs was to fix milestones/targets that 
were both ambitious and realistic, with the EC often influencing MAs to modify objectives, outcome 
indicators or targets.56 Subsequently, challenges are encountered in relation to administrative 
burdens, gathering and maintaining appropriate data, revising targets, lack of certainty about the 
Performance Reserve and questions around the added value of the process.  
Key questions/issues set out at the start of this paper were:  
x :KDWDUHSURJUDPPHV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIZRUNLQJZLWKWKH3)" 
Based on the experience of the IQ-Net programmes, the form and format of the PF differ 
substantially. This research highlights the considerable variation in IQ-1HWSURJUDPPHV¶H[SHULHQFHV
of establishing and working with the PF. For some it has been a comparatively streamlined approach, 
working with a small number of mainly common indicators. For others, a wide range of indicators 
cover numerous types and areas of intervention. For some authorities, the PF is still evolving, with 
milestones and targets being revised. IQ-Net programmes widely acknowledge the complexities 
involved in establishing the PF, in particular selecting reliable, comparable dates that accurately 
convey programme interventions, with specific challenges noted in relation to innovative, soft and 
complex interventions. 
As programmes progress, the questions raised focus more on the operation of the PF and the 
associated Performance Review and Performance Reserve and the role of the PF in supporting 
effective and efficient programme management, implementation and results.  
x ,V D PRUH µVWUDWHJLF¶ UROH RI WKH 3) EHLQJ IXOILOOHG" :KDW GRHV WKH 3) DFWXDOO\ WHOO
programme managers, what does it do for programme focus, implementation 
efficiency, improved delivery etc.? 
,Q WHUPV RI WKH µVWUDWHJLF¶ YDOXH RI WKH 3) SURJUDPPH H[SHULHQFHV KDYH YDULHG 6RPH ,4-Net 
programme managers have found working with the PF a valuable exercise, offering insights and tools 
to support programme development and delivery. However, for others the PF has been a burdensome 
obligation with little added value for the programmes. For example, the point is raised that 
mechanisms like PF and n+3 can support efficiency in spending. However, delivering good results is 
more dependent on good projects, and pressure to spend and meet targets can even undermine this 
link and shift the emphasis away from results. 
x Is this approach to performance management something that could be taken forward in 
the future?  
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 ECA (2017a) op. cit.  
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Looking to the future in a context of growing needs and budgetary discipline, it is argued that a 
FRQWLQXHG IRFXVRQSHUIRUPDQFH LV µXQDYRLGDEOH¶57 IQ-Net programme managers largely agree with 
the underlying logic of the PF from the EC point of view, e.g. France, Vlaanderen. It is clear that there 
is a lot of support for some form of performance-related measures, e.g. in Austria, Croatia, 
England and Finland. For example, in Croatia the process was found to be very useful and should be 
carried forward. In Germany, the Federal Finance Ministry has argued strongly in favour of a 
Performance Reserve.58 In England, the MA supports the continued use of realistic performance-
related measures in the delivery of ERDF programmes and the need to monitor the performance of 
projects in achieving their output and other targets. However, this should not increase the already 
large burden on MAs and grant recipients. In Greece, overall the preference of the respondents is for 
the framework to remain the same. 
As has been highlighted there are concerns about the current approach. Many MAs would like to see 
an end to the Performance Reserve (or a PF but no reserve) due to the µred tape¶ that it generates for 
the MA and IB. In Denmark, for example, the MA does not consider the PF a useful feature for 
programming but stressed that this is not a rejection of result orientation more widely, but purely of the 
PF. There is recognition of the value of a result orientation, but it needs to be done in the right way 
and the PF/Performance Reserve is not necessarily the way to do this. There is support for the 
general principle, but questions have been raised about the current application in a highly complex 
system such as Cohesion policy.  
With this in mind, the paper outlined some suggestions and recommendations for change to reinforce 
the positive elements of the PF and address concerns. These include recommendations to help 
address administrative burdens, maximising value and quality of indicators and data, encourage 
greater differentiation in the thematic application of the PF, improve flexibility and responsiveness, 
and build added value. However, looking further towards post 2020, further questions have to be 
raised:  
x 7KHHPSKDVLVRQWUDFNLQJKDUGLQGLFDWRUVRIµJURZWKDQGMREV¶FRXOGZRUNZHOOIRUWKe current 
focus of Cohesion policy, but how well can it adapt to changing policy needs/focus?  
x Does a reliance on reliable, accessible, measurable data run the risk of building path 
dependency and a lack of flexibility into the programmes?  
x In a potentially changing policy context, is data gathering worth the effort? Are new 
approaches needed? 
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 µEU cohesion policy has to maintain its focus on sustainable growth and employment. The funds available 
ought to be put to maximum use, which is why we call for the creation of more powerful incentives for Member 
States to use funds in a way that is more performance oriented. Existing instruments such as the PF ought to be 
reviewed and refined to be as effective as possible¶, see joint statement by the German government and the 
German Länder on EU Cohesion Policy beyond 2020 from June 2017.  
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ANNEX: COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS FOR ERDF SUPPORT  
No.  Unit Name 
Productive Investment 
1  enterprises Number of enterprises receiving support 
2  enterprises Number of enterprises receiving grants 
3  enterprises Number of enterprises receiving financial support 
other than grants 
4  enterprises Number of enterprises receiving non-financial 
support 
5  enterprises Number of new enterprises supported 
6  ¼ Private investment matching public support to 
enterprises (grants) 
7  ¼ Private investment matching public support to 
enterprises (non-grants) 
8  full time equivalents Employment increase in supported enterprises 
9 Sustainable tourism Visits/year Increase in expected number of visits to supported 
sites of cultural and natural heritage and attractions 
10 ICT Infrastructure households Additional households with broadband access of at 
least 30 Mbps 
Transport 
11 Railway kilometres Total length of new railway lines of which: TEN-T 
12 Railway kilometres Total length of reconstructed or upgraded railway 
lines of which: TEN-T 
13 Roads kilometres Total length of newly built roads of which: TEN-T 
14 Roads kilometres Total length of reconstructed or upgraded roads of 
which: TEN-T 
15 Urban transport kilometres Total length of new or improved tram and metro lines 
16 Inland waterways kilometres Total length of new or improved inland waterways 
 
Environment 
17 Solid waste tonnes/year Additional waste recycling capacity 
18 Water supply persons Additional population served by improved water 
supply 
19 Wastewater treatment population equivalent Additional population served by improved 
wastewater treatment 
20 Risk prevention and 
management 
persons Population benefiting from flood protection measures 
21 Risk prevention and 
management 
persons Population benefiting from forest fire protection 
measures 
22 Land rehabilitation hectares Total surface area of rehabilitated land 
23 Nature and biodiversity hectares Surface area of habitats supported in order to attain 
a better conservation status 
Research, Innovation 
24  full-time equivalents Number of new researchers in supported entities 
25  full-time equivalents Number of researchers working in improved 
research infrastructure facilities 
26  enterprises Number of enterprises cooperating with research 
institutions 
27  ¼ Private investment matching public support in 
innovation or R&D projects 
28  enterprises Number of enterprises supported to introduce new to 
the market products 
29  enterprises Number of enterprises supported to introduce new to 
the firm products 
Energy and Climate change 
30 Renewables MW Additional capacity of renewable energy production 
31 Energy efficiency households Number of households with improved energy 
consumption classification 
32  kWh/year Decrease of annual primary energy consumption of 
public buildings 
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33  users Number of additional energy users connected to 
smart grids 
34 GHG reduction tonnes of CO2 eq Estimated annual decrease of GHG 
Social Infrastructure 
35 Childcare & education persons Capacity of supported childcare or education 
infrastructure 
36 Health persons Population covered by improved health services 
Urban Development specific indicators 
37  persons Population living in areas with integrated urban 
development strategies 
38  square metres Open space created or rehabilitated in urban areas 
39  square metres Public or commercial buildings built or renovated in 
urban areas 
40  Housing units Rehabilitated housing in urban areas 
 
 
